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tax notes state
Tax Cannibalization by State Corporate Taxes:
Policy Implications
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors clarify a point of possible
confusion about tax cannibalization issues and
discuss policy implications.
In a recent article,1 we reported revised
estimates for the magnitude of the “tax
cannibalization” problem caused by state
corporate income taxes in 2020. To repeat just two
striking take-aways from this analysis, we
estimated that California’s corporate income tax
rate is currently destroying somewhere in the
range of 51 cents to $1.06 of net revenues from
other jurisdictions, including the federal
government, per marginal tax dollar raised by
2
California, and that Pennsylvania’s corporate

income tax rate is likely destroying somewhere in
the range of 55 cents to $1.24 of net revenues from
other governments per marginal tax dollar raised
by Pennsylvania.3
Tax cannibalization operates through (for
example) a state corporate income tax rate
inducing taxpayers to engage in additional taxreduction behaviors such as profit-shifting
transactions to move reported income to taxhaven jurisdictions that deprive both the state and
federal government of revenue. Because state tax
policymakers generally do not consider the fiscal
externalities of how state tax policy choices affect
federal revenues, the tax cannibalization problem
can negatively bias state tax policy choices from
the perspective of national welfare. In prior
research, we have argued that our estimates for
tax cannibalization have profound implications
for numerous debates about fiscal federalism in
the United States — including the design of
4
federal- and state-level taxes, questions about
constitutional doctrines,5 and controversies
6
regarding economic development tax incentives.
The tax cannibalization problem is especially
large for state corporate income taxes because
state governments piggyback on a deeply flawed
federal corporate tax base. In this article, we
clarify a point of possible confusion about these
issues and then discuss some policy implications.

3
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Gamage and Shanske, “Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in
the United States,” 111 Nw. University L. Rev. 295 (2017).
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A Clarification: Effective Versus Statutory
Corporate Tax Rates
Before we discuss policy implications, we
think it’s important to clarify a question that we
have been asked about our revised estimates for
7
2020. Why is it that we base our analysis on
statutory federal- and state-level corporate
income tax rates, rather than on estimates for
effective corporate tax rates?
Consider the following explanation from a
8
2017 Congressional Budget Office report :
The effective corporate tax rate, which is a
measure of the tax on a marginal
investment, is more informative for
decisions about whether to expand
ongoing projects in those countries in
which a company already operates. In
contrast, businesses focus on the narrower
statutory corporate tax rate when they
develop legal and accounting strategies to
shift income earned in high-tax countries
to low-tax jurisdictions — especially lowtax jurisdictions in which those businesses
do not plan to invest and from which they
thus expect no benefits from tax
preferences for business investments.
In our view, the tax cannibalization problem is
primarily caused by tax-gaming transactions,
what the CBO report calls “legal and accounting
strategies.” We think this is especially true on the
margin.
One way to contemplate this question is to
ask: Why do corporate income taxpayers with
positive tax liabilities not engage in even more tax
gaming than they currently do? For instance, a
corporate taxpayer reporting income in a foreign
low-tax jurisdiction could become even more
aggressive with transfer pricing valuations to shift
further reported profits to that low-tax
jurisdiction. Why does it not do so?
Ultimately, we think that corporate taxpayers
must engage in some form of cost-benefit analysis
when contemplating incremental tax-gaming

7

Several different readers have asked us versions of this question.
But we especially owe thanks to Karen Burke for explaining to us the
importance of clarifying this point.

transactions. The benefit of shifting an additional
dollar of reported profits abroad can be measured
by the combined state and local domestic
statutory corporate income tax rates minus the
relevant foreign jurisdiction tax rate. The costs
include increased risks of audit and legal
sanctions, increased risks of negative publicity,
any real costs associated with effectuating the taxgaming transaction, and any complexity or other
accounting or management type costs associated
with effectuating the transaction. The key takeaway here is that marginal benefit from
incremental tax gaming is a function of the
combined U.S. state and federal statutory tax rates.
Some Policy Implications
A thorough discussion of the policy
implications of these estimates is beyond the
scope of this short article. The policy implications
we discussed in our three prior articles generally
remain applicable in 2020, but with the
magnitude of some aspects of the tax
cannibalization problem somewhat reduced.
Nevertheless, a few points seem worth
emphasizing here.
First, Congress reduced the federal corporate
income tax rate in 2017 in part as a response to the
growing problem of corporate taxpayers
engaging in tax planning to shift profits to foreign
low-tax and tax-haven jurisdictions. Yet our
analysis implies that a better approach to dealing
with this problem would be for the federal
government to encourage state governments to
move away from using the corporate income tax
base.
To understand why, consider that, at the
margin, state corporate income tax rates generate
incentives for taxpayers to engage in profit
shifting that are similar to those generated by the
federal tax rate. But state tax rates then create
additional economic waste through horizontal
distortions, making state corporate income tax
rates much worse in terms of efficiency than the
9
federal tax rate. Moreover, multijurisdictional
issues created by state corporate income taxes are
notoriously complex, producing large
administrative and compliance costs.

8

Congressional Budget Office, International Comparisons of
Corporate Income Tax Rates, at 3 (Mar. 2017).
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We think it likely that, at some point in the
coming decades, Congress will contemplate
increasing the federal corporate income tax rate
above its current 21 percent rate. As an alternative
or an accompaniment to this, our analysis implies
that Congress should consider encouraging state
governments to reduce or abandon their
corporate income taxes. There are a number of
ways Congress might attempt to do so, some of
10
which we explained in our 2017 article. Perhaps
our top recommendation would be for Congress
to work with state governments to devise a new
state business entity tax base that, in contrast to
today’s state corporate income taxes, would not
exacerbate the problem of profit shifting by
corporate taxpayers. Congress could then offer
subsidies or other incentives for state
governments to swap their existing corporate
income taxes for this new tax base. Promising
ideas for such a new tax base include (a) statelevel value added taxes that would be designed
around a federal-level registry for cross-border
11
transactions, (b) variations on New Hampshire’s
business enterprise tax,12 or (c) other approaches
13
for entity-level consumption taxes.
Second, the problem of state and local
economic development tax incentives has
received increased attention of late, in part
because of Amazon.com’s well-publicized
14
competition for its secondary headquarters. We
have been approached by congressional staffers to
advise on proposals for federal legislation that
would regulate these economic development tax
15
incentives. As we argued in an earlier article, the
tax cannibalization problem makes it so that the
federal government has a large and direct stake in
state and local governments’ offering of economic
development tax incentives and thus offers the
federal government a promising hook for
regulating these practices. In another article we

published earlier this year, we discussed the
implications of presidential candidate Andrew
Yang’s proposed federal tax on subnational tax
16
incentives.
Third, from the perspective of the states, there
remains little reason to move away from the
corporate income tax. Indeed, the recent changes
made by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduces the
incentives for states to make such a change. This is
because, first, states can credibly claim that their
corporate income taxes are now less distorting
than they were. And, second, considering the
capping of the state and local tax deduction, some
states can claim that cannibalizing the federal
base is a sort of rough justice given that the federal
government has made it harder to tax
17
progressively at the state level.
Most interestingly, the TCJA contains base
broadening provisions that states can conform to,
such as global intangible low-taxed income and
the base erosion and antiabuse tax. To the extent
that there is a credible argument that the federal
government set its tax rate on this income too low,
states supplementing the federal rate as to shifted
income are not cannibalizing the federal base but
protecting it. Further, to the extent that state
conformity is not perfect and, in effect, is taxing a
taxpayer along a different margin, then that too
reduces cannibalization. It is thus arguable that
the way that some states are conforming to GILTI
— and could — are efficient in this way.18
We hope to further discuss these and other
policy implications of the tax cannibalization
problem in future writings. We continue to view
the tax cannibalization problem as playing a
central — and mostly negative — role in the
dynamics of U.S. fiscal federalism. By shedding
light on this problem, we hope to reveal more
promising opportunities for fiscal cooperation
between the federal and state governments. 
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Id. at 355-68.
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Gamage and Shanske, “On Yang’s Proposed Federal Tax on
Subnational Tax Incentives,” Tax Notes State, Oct. 7, 2019, p. 25.
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For elaboration and discussion, see Shanske, “Expanding State
Fiscal Capacity, Part I: A New and Improved Consumption Tax Paired
With a Tax on a Federal Windfall (the QBI Deduction),” 22 Fla. Tax Rev.
448 (2019).
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Gamage and Shanske, supra note 6.

For further elaboration of this argument, see Shanske, “States Can
and Should Respond Strategically to Federal Tax Law,” 45 Ohio N.U. L.
Rev. 543 (2019).
18

For further development of this argument, see Shanske, “States and
the US International Tax Regime: An Analytic Framework Applied to the
Questions of GILTI Conformity and Worldwide Combination,”
forthcoming. See also Gamage and Shanske, “Why States Can Tax the
GILTI,” Tax Notes State, Mar. 18, 2019, p. 967; and Gamage and Shanske,
“Why States Should Tax the GILTI,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 4, 2019, p. 751.
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